感觉忧郁(诺罗夫):在一个复杂的朝鲜 Web3 入侵内部

  • June 11, 2025 Incident: Huntress received contact about an end user potentially downloading a malicious Zoom extension. Installing the Huntress EDR agent revealed the intrusion. It was attributed to North Korean (DPRK) APT subgroup TA444.

    • Initial access: An employee at a cryptocurrency foundation received a Telegram message with a Calendly link to a fake Zoom domain. During a Zoom meeting with deepfakes, they were told to download a Zoom extension. The downloaded file was an AppleScript named zoom_sdk_support.scpt.
    • Technical analysis: Recovered 8 malicious binaries. Telegram 2 (Nim) was the persistent implant. Root Troy V4 (Go) was a backdoor used to download and execute other implants. InjectWithDyld (C++) was a binary loader. Other binaries included a keylogger (XScreen), an infostealer (CryptoBot), and more.
    • Decrypted payloads: Nim Implant (Trojan 1) for command interaction and a base app.
    • Keylogger: XScreen (keyboardd) collected keystrokes, clipboard, and screen.
    • Infostealer: CryptoBot focused on cryptocurrency theft.
  • Meeting application social engineering: Train employees to identify common attacks starting with social engineering related to remote meeting software.
  • Conclusion: macOS is becoming a larger target for threat actors. BlueNoroff used Mac-specific techniques in this targeted attack.
  • IOCs:

    • Files: SHA256 hashes and names of various malicious files.
    • Infrastructure: IP addresses of malicious domains like safeupload.online, metamask.awaitingfor.site/update, etc.
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